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As many scholars have noted, constitutional rights to things like health care,
housing, and food are critically important to courts in the developing world even though
they are basically absent from U.S. constitutional law and discourse. 1 That is, the key
debate in the rest of the world is not on whether social rights should be included in
constitutions – they are almost automatically included. It is on how to enforce these rights
so as to make them effective.
This has created an important debate on methods of enforcement. I note here that
this debate has been dominated largely by a single case (South Africa v. Grootboom 2), and
at a broader level by the work of a single court (the South African Constitutional Court).
The case uses a dialogue-based or weak-form method of enforcement, where the court
points out that the state has violated the constitutional right to housing by failing to
prioritize low-income people with immediate need, but refuses to tell the parliament what
kinds of steps it needs to take in order to fill that gap. The case is celebrated, especially
by US constitutional theorists, as potentially successfully hitting two separate theoretical
concerns – the need to make social rights “real” and not just paper rights, and the need to
lessen the tension between judicial review and democracy, which is said to be at its
height when enforcing these kinds of rights.
In this paper, I first summarize Grootboom and the broader jurisprudence of the
South African court (Part I), and then explain why that model has not been followed by
other courts around the world (Part II). In other words, Grootboom forms a strange onecase canon, critically important in academic theory but un-influential in practice. In the
real world, most courts which have developed a vibrant social rights jurisprudence have
focused on other mechanisms, including individualized enforcement, injunctions in order
to stop movements away from the status quo, and, in rarer cases, full-on structural
injunctions. This appears to be because of two major factors – doubts about the efficacy
of the weak-form model vis-a-vis many configurations of political institutions in the
developing world, and a marked lack of remedial creativity in most court systems.
Finally, in Part III I reflect a little about what the continuing dominance of Grootboom,
despite its practical unimportance, means. It suggests that comparative constitutional law,
at least in the United States, continues to be dominated by the search for answers to
theoretical puzzles that stem from U.S constitutional law, such as the countermajoritarian difficulty. This aim is clearly valuable, but the field might be well-served by
focusing more on the theoretical and practical problems that occur in the countries
generating comparative jurisprudence.
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I.

The Focus on Grootboom and South Africa

Few fields have been as dominated by a single case as the literature on social
rights enforcement; the case has received an extraordinary amount of attention in the
scholarly literature. And much of the attention that has not focused on Grootboom itself
has focused on a handfull of other well-known cases from South Africa.
Grootboom arose when a group of residents living in a squatter settlement moved
onto land earmarked for low-cost housing, and were evicted by local authorities. The
group sued, arguing that they had a right to immediate access to dignified housing under
the South African constitution. The South African Constitutional Court held that the
political branches in South Africa had indeed violated the constitution by failing to
develop a housing plan that would meet the immediate needs of the poorest people most
in need of assistance, like the plaintiff. 3 But the Court refused to order an individualized
remedy for the plaintiffs, such as an order that the state provide them with housing – the
constitution did not create a right to housing “immediately upon demand.” 4 Nor did the
Court give the details of such a plan and require the political branches to adopt it, or try
to implement the plan itself. Instead, it stated that the political branches had the
obligation to “devise and implement a coherent, coordinated program” and that a
“reasonable” part of the total housing budget had to be reserved for those in desperate,
immediate need for housing. 5 The Court appeared to be concerned that it would lack the
legitimacy and capacity to issue a stronger order. 6
A prominent group of American constitutionalists lauded the decision as finding a
way to reconcile two imperatives previously thought irreconcilable by most – the
enforcement of the detailed social rights now found in most constitutions and the
assurance that courts do not overstep their bounds of democratic legitimacy and capacity.
Mark Tushnet wrote that the Court’s work constituted a new kind of judicial review,
“weak form review,” that allowed courts to judicially enforce these rights without
involving them in complex public policy decisions or letting them run roughshod over the
legislature. 7 In other words, the Court gave the right to housing “some judicially
enforceable content,” but at the same time, gave “legislatures an extremely broad range
of discretion about providing” the right. 8 In a similar vein, Cass Sunstein wrote that the
Court had effectively “steer[ed] a middle course” between holding socio-economic rights
nonjusticiable and holding them to “create an absolute duty” to provide housing or food
or health care for everyone who needs it. 9 Instead, the Court had enforced the right to
“promot[e] a certain kind of deliberation, not by preempting it, as a result of directing
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political attention to interests that would otherwise be disregarded in ordinary political
life.” 10
It is important to emphasize that these comments were aimed at accommodating
enforcement of social rights to important problems in U.S. constitutional theory. A line of
scholarship by American academics has long argued that courts lack both the capacity
and democratic pedigree to enforce social rights; 11 these rights are different from
ordinary rights in degree if not in kind. Enforcement of these rights might require that the
judge order the state to provide people with goods or services, which would raise the
specter of “the courts running everything – raising taxes and deciding how the money
should be spent.” 12 Judges lack the democratic legitimacy to carry out this kind of
policymaking, and they lack the capacity to do so. Courts are unsuited to decide where to
spend the state’s limited resources, and they will have trouble giving precise content to
vague rights of the sort of the right to food or housing. 13 Fuller’s observation that courts
perform poorly when adjudicating “polycentric” issues is particularly applicable to
socioeconomic rights; they have an inherent “[r]aging indeterminacy.” 14 The result of all
this is that courts would be unlikely, in practice, to actually enforce socio-economic
rights: they would be unwilling to incur the wrath of the political branches or to fulfill
undertakings located so far beyond their own capacity. 15 In contrast, Sunstein and
Tushnet argued that if done right, under the Grootboom rubric, social rights enforcement
could avoid causing insurmoutable problems of capacity and democratic legitimacy.
The broader work on South African social rights enforcement tends to reinforce
the overarching message of the literature on Grootboom: social rights enforcement is a
plausible response to the counter-majoritarian difficulty and related critiques of the
capacity of courts, if undertaken in a sufficiently dialogical manner. 16 For example, the
Court’s Soobramney decision, where it refused to order individualized treatment for an
individual dying of kidney failure is also seen as emblematic as an example of judicial
self-restraint. The Court emphasized (1) the limited resources of the state, (2) that the
treatment would need to be provided to all others in a similar condition, and (3) that the
10
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legislature had the ability, at first instance, to determine the distribution of limited
resources in order to fulfill the right to health. 17 Commentators have noted that the court
properly considered the health care system as a whole (rather than focusing only on the
individual involved in this case), and properly emphasized the deference that was due in
running that system to the government.
In contrast, when the court has undertaken social rights enforcement, is has used a
weak-form, dialogue-based approach. Brian Ray argues that the South African Court has
more recently tweaked the Grootboom approach for a similar tactic that Ray calls
“engagement.” 18 The core of the engagement remedy is that the Court orders the state to
negotiate with the plaintiffs so that a satisfactory agreement can hopefully be reached.
For example, in the City of Johannesburg case, 300 residents of an unsafe building in a
slum sued to stop the state from evicting them forcibly in order to carry out a large-scale
urban regeneration. The Constitutional Court issued an interim order requiring that the
city and the residents “engage with each other meaningfully…in light of the values of the
Constitution, the constitutional and statutory duties of the municipality and the rights and
duties of the citizens concerned.” 19 The parties reached agreement; the City agreed to
stop evictions in the short-term and to refurbish rather than destroy many of the buildings
in the area. 20 Ray argues that engagement, which the Court has also used in subsequent
cases, is an alternative to Grootboom that also manages the tension between the need to
enforce these rights and the capacity and legitimacy problems that Courts feel when they
enforce them. Engagement “falls somewhat short of the call by the Constitutional
Courts’ critics for full-fledged judicial interpretation and enforcement, but the same
features that make engagement something less than strong court enforcement also
enhance its legitimacy.” 21
II.

Grootboom as Aberration

The puzzling thing about Grootboom is that despite its centrality to the academic
literature, particularly in the United States, it has not been followed by other courts
around the world. As I have noted in previous work, 22 we can basically construct a
typology of four different kinds of remedies on social rights questions, which have
different effects along various dimensions like beneficiaries, capacity costs, intrusiveness,
etc.
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Table 1: Types and Effects of Socio-Economic Rights Remedies
Legitimacy/Capacity Effectiveness at
Likely
Costs on Court
Changing Practice Beneficiaries
Individualized
Low
Won’t alter
Middle & upperenforcement
bureaucratic
Class Groups
behavior
Negative
Low
Will strike down
Middle & upperinjunctions
laws and maintain
class groups
status quo
Weak-form
Low to moderate
May not cause
Nobody, although
enforcement
much change
may aim at poor
Structural
High
May alter
May target lower
enforcement
bureaucratic
income groups
practice
Approach

Individualized enforcement occurs when a court orders that a particular treatment,
housing, etc, be given to a particular individual plaintiff. These cases are particularly
common with the right to health: a plaintiff goes to court to get access to an expensive
medicine or medical treatment that is being denied by their insurance provider or by the
state. In other words, precisely the type of enforcement that was denied in the
Soobramoney case on the grounds that it would be too intrusive on democratic
institutions and would have perverse democratic effects. 23 The negative injunction model
issues broader orders against government policies in order to freeze the status quo. For
example, say the government tries to cut existing pension benefits or the salaries of
government workers; a court may hold that the cut violates constitutional provisions, and
thus hold that the government must maintain the current level of benefits rather than
imposing the cuts. Unlike the individualized enforcement model, these cases affect lots of
people at once and thus can have significant effects on the government’s budget.
The advantages of these first two models are that they relatively easy for a court
to administer and thus may not stretch traditional notions of judicial role very much. A
major disadvantage (as I have noted elsewhere) is that their benefits seem to accrue
mostly to middle and upper-class plaintiffs. In the individualized model, only wealthier
plaintiffs seem to sue even where suing is relatively cheap and uncomplicated. 24 In the
negative injunction model, the main problem is that the poor have little that can
realistically be taken away by the state, and thus these cases tend to protect things like
23
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pensions and salaries that belong to middle-class and wealthy groups. Further, neither
model seems to do much to improve bureaucratic performance, so there isn’t much of an
indirect effect on the poor through improved public policy. In countries like Colombia
and Brazil that rely heavily on the individualized model, bureaucracies seem to deny even
obviously-covered treatments and to take their chances that a plaintiff might sue, rather
than altering practices to conform with well-established judicial doctrine. 25
While very systematic empirical evidence on patterns of judicial enforcement is
lacking, the evidence that we have seems to indicate very strongly that robust
enforcement of social rights is pretty common in developing countries. However, most of
the enforcement that exists seems to be of one of these first two varieties. 26 Various
countries seem to rely mainly on models of individualized enforcement, and even
countries that don’t have much of a social rights jurisprudence seem to block cuts in
benefits or other departures from the status quo. 27
The third and fourth models in the table are much rarer. Weak-form or dialoguebased enforcement like Grootboom is pretty much confined to South Africa. Several
countries, however, have experimented with variations of structural injunctions.
Structural injunctions of course had their heyday in the United States, but are now
generally disfavored both by courts and academic commentators – the consensus seems
to be that their capacity and legitimacy costs are usually too high to pay. 28 Several other
countries, however, are beginning to experiment with these kinds of remedies in order to
enforce socio-economic rights. In India, for example, the court has tried a structural
injunction approach to enforcing the right to food, and seemed to have leveraged some
important changes in government bureaucracies. 29 Similar things have occurred in
25
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Colombia, where massive structural cases on internal refugees and healthcare have had
highly imperfect but generally positive results. 30 Structural remedies obviously do stretch
judicial capacity considerably, but they may hold out some promise for overcoming the
strong class-affect that plagues the individualized enforcement and negative injunction
approaches. However, it is important to note that even countries that have used structural
injunctions, such as Colombia, still do most of their social rights enforcement in one of
the first two models. 31
It appears, then, that courts enforcing social rights have not used approaches
similar to those in either Grootboom or the engagement cases. The key question for
purposes of this paper is why they haven’t done so. A full answer to this question is of
course highly complex, but I focus here on two problems. The first lies with political
institutions; the weak-form models seem to me to rest on assumptions about political
responsiveness and capacity that may be more appropriate in developed countries than in
developing ones. The second lies with judges; the South African model (like the
structural injunction model) relies on assumptions about judicial creativity and
innovativeness that rarely hold in developing countries.
A. The Capacity of Political Institutions
The dialogue-based or weak-form model seems to depend on a pretty responsive
set of political branches; when the judiciary acts by stating that the constitution has been
violated, the legislature or president needs to act to remedy the issue. The mechanisms by
which this occurs have not been fully fleshed out, but it would seem to depend on either
mass-based or elite-based pressure being placed on the political branches to comply with
the constitution. Yet some work has noted that political institutions are dysfunctional as
representative institutions and lack capacity in many countries where social rights
enforcement is important. 32
In South Africa itself, there has been an interesting debate about how much
Grootboom actually accomplished in housing policy. Some South African scholars have
argued that weak-form enforcement, as exemplified by Grootboom, did not work. 33
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Many of these academics have argued that Grootboom had more or less the right idea but
needed to be ratcheted up: the remedy needed to be made a less “weak” in order to be
effective. 34 Similar questions have been raised about the general effectiveness of the
engagement remedy, at least as it is currently used by the South African Constitutional
Court – engagement has failed in several subsequent cases. 35
The dominant ANC party in South Africa is broadly speaking, ideologically on
board with the transformative program in the South African constitution, particularly
when it comes to things like social rights. But at the same time, South Africa has been a
one-party or dominant-party state, and as various actors have pointed out, such regimes
may have greatly reduced incentives to respond to demands from the public. 36 Further,
the Constitutional Court itself has never been a particularly popular institution. 37
Other countries suffer from dysfunctions in their party systems that might make
political responsiveness even less likely. In general, where party systems are poorly
institutionalized, parties tend to be personalist vehicles for particular leaders rather than
ideologically-oriented. 38 These systems tend to have high turnover in their parties, and
legislatures tend to have lots of small parties rather than a few big parties. Further, party
discipline in these systems tends to be low – members change parties frequently,
dependent more on patronage from particular leaders than particular ideological
programs. In these sorts of party systems, legislatures have trouble passing coherent,
programmatic laws, and particularly in legislation that is responsive to the public. Courts
in these kinds of systems may be acting rationally by refusing to kick an issue to the
political branches, given the low likelihood of a response. 39
B. Judicial Creativity
A second major factor stems from judicial behavior in most of the countries
where social rights enforcement is important. Here there may be an important difference
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between civil law and common law countries: the common law judiciaries like India and
South Africa seem to be more creative in coming up with remedies, although some of the
most innovative courts work in civil law traditions (e.g., Colombia).
Most judges seem comfortable working with remedies that put little stress on judicial
role. 40 The point is not that these remedies, ultimately, are non-intrusive – it is that they
can be assimilated into familiar models of what judges ought to be doing. Thus, judges
are most comfortable issuing a single remedy to a single plaintiff, and don’t think much
about the systematic effect. Traditionalist judges in Brazil therefore feel fine issuing
decisions granting access to medicines even when, on aggregate, those cases are having a
huge budgetary impact. 41 Similarly, it seems that relatively traditionalist judges feel
comfortable issuing injunctions against movements from the status quo. Often the
injunctions issued are against pension, public-sector salary, and other budgetary reforms
that have a huge impact on the finances of the state. 42 Nonetheless, the judge is
comfortable because the order, blocking a law from coming into effect, fits accepted
notions of judicial role.
It is obvious that complex remedies like structural injunctions put a much more
significant strain on judicial role, because they ask judges to supervise parts of the public
bureaucracy, and often to issue specific policy orders to those bureaucracies. 43 In subtler
ways, I think that weak-form cases like Grootboom also strain accepted notions of
judicial role in many countries, because they ask judges to basically issue systematic
orders to the legislative branch stating that new legislation must be passed, even if these
orders lack any definite content. Given that judges in most developing countries still
cling to traditional theories of judicial role, we should not expect any significant spread
of weak-form exercises of judicial review in the near future.
III.
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The puzzle, then, is that Grootboom is ubiquitous in the work of comparative
constitutional scholars, especially in the United States, and yet very unimportant in
comparative judicial practice. I argue here that this tells us something about the state of
comparative constitutional law as a discipline in the U.S. – it remains centered on
theoretical concerns that arise out of American constitutional law, and seeks to solve
problems that come out of our own constitutional experience and theorizing. Thus,
Grootboom is important not because it “solves” the problem of how to enforce social
rights in developing countries, but because it helps defuse the tension between judicial
review of social rights and the counter-majoritarian difficulty in American constitutional
theory. And this has broader implications for the nature of judicial review of all types in a
mature democracy like the United States.
This orientation for the field – using comparative materials in order to better
understand practical and theoretical problems in American constitutionalism – is very
valuable. I think it is plausible that we can gain more leverage on problems in US
constitutional theory – on the effectiveness of structural jurisprudence in maintaining
federalism or the separation of powers, say, or on the interchange between domestic and
international law, by considering other systems. But we might also want to consider, at
least sometimes, comparative constitutional law based on a more outward-facing
orientation, focusing on the practical and theoretical considerations in the countries
creating this jurisprudence rather than considerations derived from the United States.
Such an approach changes the feel of the debate on social rights. Rather than
focusing on the tension between judicial review and democracy, we might instead focus
on the practical effects of its enforcement. It now seems clear that existing approaches
benefit mainly wealthier groups in most developing countries. 44 Moreover, given the lack
of remedial creativity possessed by most judges around the world, this pattern seems
likely to continue – the remedies used by most judges seem to inherently favor plaintiffs
from the middle- and upper- classes. But this doesn’t necessarily mean that judicial
enforcement of social rights is counterproductive, just that it probably can’t serve the goal
of significant poverty reduction. Judicial enforcement of social rights for the middleclass might be valuable for other reasons. It might stabilize democracy by increasing the
legitimacy of the regime; efficacy in serving the needs of even wealthier groups is a
political resource in short supply in most developing countries. It might also, through
time, help to create a constitutional culture in a country; as middle- and upper- class
groups learn to take constitutional rights seriously, political parties and individual
politicians might do so as well. And this process, through long periods of time, might
make political bodies more responsive to the rights and needs of the poor. The main
point, then, is that the issue needs to be studied from perspectives other than its shortterm intrusiveness on democracy in a given country.
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See generally 2011 Texas Law Review Symposium, Latin American Constitutionalism, 89 Texas L. Rev.
1587 (2011) (containing a variety of arguments and evidence casting doubt on the claim that social rights
enforcement significantly helps the poor); David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53
Harv. Int’l L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2012)

More broadly, we might reflect on the different framings of central problems in
comparative constitutional law outside as opposed to inside the United States. In
particular, the counter-majoritarian difficulty appears to be less central to constitutional
theory elsewhere. While many scholars have noted the importance of the transnational
discourse or migration of ideas between judges and academics in different countries, 45 we
still don’t have a great idea exactly what sorts of ideas are being exchanged. But much of
this conversation seems to have its roots in international human rights. To focus on Latin
America as an example, the “new constitutional” push to limit executive power seems to
have its origins in the international human rights discourse within the region. And there is
a tightening relationship between regional human rights courts like the Inter-American
Court, national judiciaries, and NGOs. 46 Further, many developing countries inside and
outside of the region require that Constitutional Courts consider international law in
issuing decisions, and many give international human rights treaties constitutional or
supra-constitutional status. 47 International human rights law is a very different kind of
discourse from US constitutional law, based on natural rights notions rather than ideas
about institutional role.
Other factors as well may help to give constitutional law in many countries a
more “technical” and less “political” feel than it has in the United States. Scholars have
noted, for example, that the reception of instrumental conceptions of law like law and
economics has been far less marked in Europe than in the United States. 48 This point
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probably applies even more strongly to Latin America; these legal cultures are often
much less permeated by legal realist ideas. The reasons for this are complex but seem
related to traditional ideas about judicial role, especially in the civil law world. Thus, the
public and members of the political elite may be more willing to accept that constitutional
judges are discovering the right answer to constitutional questions, rather than making it
up.
The fact that constitutional law has stronger “natural law” and “technical” roots in
many other places may explain why the U.S. construction of the counter-majoritarian
difficulty seems to have less salience elsewhere. It may also explain why the American
“political” conception of constitutional law, with the two sides of the political spectrum
both having their own very thick conception of the constitution’s meaning, is exceptional.
In the United States, constitutional meaning is hotly contested between liberal and
conservative understandings; both sides rely deeply on reverence for the constitution in
their political discourse, but the two visions of what the constitution means are very
distinct. But there are other countries where constitutional meaning seems far less
political – it is largely set either by a deep-seated social consensus (as perhaps in
Germany), or it is “technical” and therefore placed outside of the scope of politics (as I
believe true in much of Latin America).
IV.

Conclusion

I have argued here that the position of Grootboom as a canonical case stems not
from its practical importance in other countries (which is close to zero), but rather
because it helps to resolve important questions about judicial role in American
constitutional theory. I have also argued that comparative constitutional law, as a
discipline, might have a different feel if it adopted its theoretical foundations from the
core concerns of countries outside the United States. The basic underpinnings of
constitutional law often seem to be more technical and less political elsewhere.
It might for example be fruitful to place the two different conceptions in tension
with one another, seeking to improve both. This requires thinking about the role that
courts are playing in different kinds of political environments. In situations where courts
are acting in newer and weaker democracies, often with dysfunctional political
institutions, little constitutional culture, etc, it might be more useful to evaluate the effects
of judicial behavior using a dynamic rather than a static model of democracy. Courts
acting in these environments should neither be able to hide behind pseudo-technical
justifications for their decisions, nor should they be evaluated by static conceptions of
judicial role that are more appropriate for mature democracies. That is, we might be less
interested in whether the court is temporarily overstepping the boundaries of judicial role,
than in whether it is helping to build a stronger democracy in the long-run. This requires
answering questions that are difficult to answer but important: is the court helping to
build a constitutional culture, therefore making both citizens and politicians more
interested in carrying out the transformative program contained in the constitutional text?
Is it helping to build up historically-weak civil society groups? Is it helping, through time,
to counteract the biases inherent in the existing political system, or is it instead (as I

suspect is often the case) reinforcing those biases? Answering these sorts of questions
might help us build theories of judicial role that are better suited to many of the countries
that have been most affected by the explosion of judicialization.

